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ABSTRACT
The state of Maryland, in collaboration with the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid, developed the first all-payer system
model in the U.S. in 1971, and later in response to financial
pressures, modernized this program to improve overall per
capita expenditure, quality of care, and the outcome of
Marylanders’ health.
We note positive change in moving its healthcare delivery
model from volume-driven care to value-driven coordinated
care: Maryland hospitals have changed their mindsets to
achieve cost reduction, health improvement, and quality of
care improvement for the state of Maryland.
Keywords
health care reform, all payer system
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2014, Maryland and Center for Medicare and Medicaid
(CMS) jointly announced the modernization of the state’s 40
year old all-payer system into a new system focusing on
overall per capita expenditure, quality of care, and outcomes
of Marylanders’ health. Reinhardt (2011) defines an allpayer system as one in which all payers pay the same price
for the same service. Although versions of all payer systems
had been attempted in Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and New York, by 2012 Maryland was the only state
continuing to operate such a system (Murray, 2012).
Maryland’s Original All Payer System
Maryland’s all-payer hospital reimbursement model shifted
financial incentives to reward results instead of volume, with
the goal of achieving healthier communities while
simultaneously slowing spending growth. CMS waived its
right to set Maryland hospital Medicare rates for five years
in return for Maryland’s commitment to keep hospital
inpatient costs below the national average. The agreement
covered Medicare hospital inpatient care and costs per visit
only (PCC, 2014) for all payers: governmental, commercial,
and self-pay (HDHMH, 2013).
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Because Maryland’s system applied only to hospital rate
setting, it is technically a “modified” all payer system, a
detail virtually always ignored and Maryland’s system is
commonly referred to as an “all payer” system, a convention
used throughout this paper. The prices were determined by a
government regulated agency, the Health Services Cost
Review Commission (HSCRC), which established rates for
each unit of service for each hospital (MHA, 2015a). The
rate is set differently for each hospital, depending on criteria
such as number of patients admitted with health insurance;
e.g., in 2015, the price of a vaginal delivery in Adventist
Health Care Shady Grove Medical Center in Maryland was
set to $5,466 (MHCC, 2015a), while the price for the same
service delivered at Johns Hopkins Hospital was $13, 137
(MHCC, 2015b).
Maryland’s all payer system was developed by the Maryland
legislature to allow State government to regulate and set
prices of acute care hospital services across the state
(Murray, 2009). Maryland and the United States had
experienced increasing costs of hospital cares after the
creation of Medicare and Medicaid: in the U.S., hospital care
accounted for 5.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and $108 billion (measured in 2002 dollars) of health care
spending in 1960, and these figures rose to 15 % of GDP and
$1.6 trillion in 2002 (Goldman and McGlynn, 2005); during
this period, Maryland’s hospitals providing services for the
uninsured were facing insolvency (Murray, 2009). In 1977,
HSCRC successfully negotiated with CMS to participate in a
modified all payer system which would cover only hospitals
(CMS, 2015).
In order to allow Maryland to develop its initial all payer
system, CMS required the cumulative growth payment of
Maryland’s Medicare spending per discharge after 1981 to
be less than the U.S average (Colmers, 2014).
Consequently, Maryland’s goals in the development of its
original all payer system were to constrain hospital’s cost
inflation, ensure hospitals’ financial stability by providing
predictable payment system, to preventing cost shifting,
increase access to health care for Maryland’s citizens, and
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increase the equity and fairness of hospital financing
(Murray, 2009). Unfortunately, modernization of
Maryland’s original all payer system became necessary
when many Maryland hospitals faced insolvency and its
Medicare waver was in jeopardy.
Modernized All Payer System
According to HSCRC (2014), effective January 1, 2014,
Maryland and CMS reached an agreement to modify its
existing all payer model for hospital services payment. This
revision was necessary because the hospital admission rate
in Maryland had increased substantially, causing increases in
overall hospital spending (Anderson and Herring, 2015).
MHA (2015b) stated that with the modernized all payer
system, Maryland would focus on reducing costs, improving
the health of the population of Maryland, and improving
quality of care, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s
Triple Aim (IHI, 2016).
In the modernized all payer model, HSCRC would still set
prices for inpatient hospital services, but Maryland hospitals
would be required to adopt a Global Budget Revenue (GBR)
reimbursement by 2017 (PCC, 2014). According to HSCRC
(2013), the GBR system was a revenue constraint as well as
a quality improvement method. Under the GBR system, each
hospital would receive an approved regulated revenue each
year and be required to operate within the budget. The
volume of care would not affect the revenue determination,
which discouraged hospitals from increasing admissions in
order to increase revenue.
Along with GBR, Maryland agreed to improving quality of
care by reducing potentially preventable conditions; e.g., the
30 day hospital re-admission rate was required to be below
the national average and the hospital-acquired infection rate
was to be reduced by 30% by 2018 (HSCRC, 2014a), in
addition, Maryland was to save $330 million in Medicare
spending by the end of fiscal year 2018 (CMS, 2014).
Consequently, Maryland set a cap limit of 3.58% on annual
total hospital cost growth in the first 3 years by 2017.
Maryland and CMS agreed that if Maryland did not
accomplish the targeted goals by fiscal year 2018, it would
resume its prior all-payer system (CMS, 2014).
2 RESULTS
Original Version All Payer System Results
Achievements of Original All Payer System
Major accomplishments of Maryland’s original all payer
model were: elimination of cost-shifting, lowered costs for
all payers, limitation of the growth of hospital per admission
cost, provision of stable and predictable income for
hospitals, promotion of financial stability for efficient and
effective hospitals and removal of the inequality in the
burden of uncompensated care (Colmers and Sharfstein,
2013; MDHMH, 2013). Because Maryland eliminated cost
shifting, hospital bills in Maryland were much lower than
any other states; e.g., the average cost of hospital charges for
a joint replacement for a Medicare patient in 2013 varied
from $88,238 in California to $21,230 in Maryland (Cauchi
and Valverde, 2013). Also, Maryland’s hospitals’ markups
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of price over cost became the lowest in the nation: in 1980
the national average markup of hospital charges in the US
was less than 25% and Maryland was slightly lower than
national average; by 2009 national average of markup of
hospital charges have increased to over 200% while
Maryland’s markups remained essentially unchanged from
1980 (Murray, 2014).
Between 1976 to 2009, Maryland’s health care cost growth
was the lowest in the U.S. (Foreman, 2014). In 1976 the
amount spent on patient care in Maryland hospitals was 25%
higher than the national average; by 2009 it was 4% below
the national average (MHA, 2013). Maryland achieved an
estimated savings of over $40 billion between 1976 and
2007 (Pohl, 2012).
Limitations of Original All Payer System
There were, however, “storm clouds on the horizon.”
Limitations of the original version of Maryland’s all payer
system included the continuing underlying incentives of feefor-services per admission per case for hospitals, outdated
measurement to evaluate efficiency of care and a lack of
incentives to improve population health and coordination of
care (Colmers, 2015; Colmers and Sharfstein, 2013;
National Health Policy Forum, 2014).
The hospital admission rate in Maryland tripled, from 0.8%
between 1990 and 2000 to 2.4% between 2001 and 2008
(Kalman et al., 2014). Largely due to this increase in
hospital admission rate, from 2013-2014 the waiver test
(which measured relative difference between national
average and Maryland’s Medicare inpatient spending)
decreased more than half, and the prediction was that within
a few years Maryland’s Medicare inpatient spending and
national average would be the same or higher (Colmers and
Sharfstein, 2013; PCC, 2014).
By 2013, the financial status of Maryland hospitals had
declined due to HSCRC’s tight rate settings of services; in
2013 Maryland hospitals averaged only a 0.8% aggregated
operating margin, very close to the break-even point (MHA,
2013). More alarming, the percentage of Maryland hospitals
reporting losses was 42%, with 25 out of 60 hospitals in
Maryland having negative operating margins.
In the original all payer system, Maryland and CMS did not
set a quality measure for Medicare waiver testing; this
resulted in declining quality of care as reflected by a high
hospital re-admission rate. Subsequently, Maryland
implemented new benchmarks for the quality of care in the
all-payer system (Kastor and Adashi, 2011); e.g., a pay per
performance program was introduced and it successfully
reduced the hospital acquired conditions by 15% over a span
of two years (Calikoglu, Murray and Feeney, 2012).
Modernized All Payer System: Early Results
The per capita annual revenue growth of Maryland hospitals
rose slightly from 1.5% in 2014 to 1.8% in 2015 (HSCRC,
2015). Also, Maryland’s goal to move 80% of hospitals to
GBR was exceeded: all 46 hospitals in Maryland changed to
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GBR the first year (HSCRC, 2014). Further, hospitals’
operation margins improved from 2.9% to 4.8% between
2014 and 2015. In addition, the growth of Medicare
spending per beneficiary was 1.5% below national growth
projection in 2014 (HSCRC, 2015).
Quality improvements have proved more challenging. One
goal was for hospitals to reduce their all-payer adjusted
readmission rate by 6.76% between calendar year 2013 and
calendar 2014, but only 15 of 46 Maryland hospitals met this
goal. As a result, the overall all payer risk adjusted
readmission rate decreased only slightly between 2013 and
2014. Because achieving this readmission rate decrease has
proved difficult, the amount of revenue at risk for hospital
performance was quadrupled from 0.5% in 2016 to 2.0% in
2017 and hospitals that met this target received a one-time
reward of up to 0.5% of their permanent inpatient revenue
(HSCRC, 2015).
3 DISCUSSION
The purpose of the study was to examine the original and
modernized Maryland all payer systems, and determine the
efficiency and sustainability of the modernized all payer
system. The literature review revealed achievements and
limitations of original all payer system and noted why
Maryland had to modernize its all payer system.
Accomplishments of the original all payer system were
substantial: elimination of cost shifting, lowering of health
care cost, reduction of markups, provision of equal access
for all Marylanders regardless of health insurance while
yielding Maryland hospitals relief from the burden of
uncompensated care. Limitations of the original all payer
system were also found: lack of strong measures to constrain
overall cost of health care and no incentives for
measurement of quality of care. Eventually the original all
payer model became unable to achieve the goals of
improving patient care, quality of care and cost of care.
The modernized all payer system was developed to
overcome weakness of the prior all payer system: Maryland
added strategies to achieve the improvement of population
health, provide quality care and better patient experiences
and to better control cost of health care. We note the
potential efficiency and sustainability of the new modernized
all-payer version with GBR, which has limited hospital per
capita growth and encouraged and rewarded hospitals to be
responsible in improving health status of the population. The
modernized all payer system has been moving its health care
delivery model from volume-driven care to value-driven
coordinated care. Maryland hospitals have changed their
business model and become more accountable to provision
of quality care while achieving cost containment.
Miller (2009) argued that better health care systems should
move away from volume-driven care to value-driven care
and should develop better payment systems including
benefits of both fee for service and capitation payment. He
also emphasized that changing payment processes was not
enough, but providers needed to change their mindsets,
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organizational structure, and business model to provide
better care. Maryland’s hospitals and health care provides
have been working on changing organizational structure,
business model, and mind sets in order to achieve Triple
Aim; thus the new model has shown potential efficiency. As
for sustainability, only time will tell.
The original Maryland all payer system, while successful,
ultimately was not sustainable. The modernized all payer
system appears to exhibit more efficiency and potential
financial feasibility than the state’s original all payer model.
Other states can try to implement an all payer system in
order to provide health care on a more equitable basis to
their citizens. If the efficiency and effectiveness of the
modernized Maryland all payer model can be demonstrated,
more widespread implementation of this (or a similar) model
may be appropriate, although the feasibility of this is
unclear. Interestingly, individuals most familiar with
Maryland’s modified all payer program appear to be
unconcerned with its generalizability (Berenson, 2015),
while others (e.g., Coyle, 2015) are more positive regarding
their state’s adoption of at least part of the modified
Maryland model. However, the modernized model does
require hospitals and business people to change their
mindset to be responsible in providing health care all
citizens, resolving social issues such as poverty and unequal
access to health care to certain population, and achieving the
triple aim.
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